Επανερμηνεία του αριστοτελικού ορισμού της ψυχής, μέσα από μια κριτική αντιπαράθεση προς τη θεωρία του Abraham Bos για τον εργαλειακό χαρακτήρ...

The present thesis attempts a clarification of the Aristotelian definition of the soul, De Anima II 1, 412b4-5, starting from a critical dispute with the theory of Abraham Bos, concerning the “instrumental” character of the soul. By analysing the whole Aristotelian Corpus and by citing a variety of passages, it thoroughly studies the expressions sw=ma fusiko/n, koino/n ti, o)rganiko/n, prw/th e)ntele/xeia, that are included in the definition of the soul, to explicate it. Hence, it proposes a new interpretation (reinterpretation) of the Aristotelian definition of the soul, demonstrating that it is not an elusive or a general one, as it has traditionally been advocated, but it delineates the primary soul, the nutritive, attesting the Stagerit’s preference for the simplest and more economical definitions.